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ABSTRACT
Brunei and Malaysia are promoting the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration but enforce
a brand of Islamic law that systematically violates it. The paradoxical ways in which
policymakers are navigating between the two, and the empirical realities of Islamic
governance, impede the project of a transdoctrinal justification of human rights.
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INTRODUCTION
The legal landscapes of Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam (henceforth Brunei)
have undergone unprecedented transformations toward an increasing
enforcement of Islamic law in recent years, accompanied by a passionate
demonization of religious pluralism among both countries’ political leaders
and governmental clergy. Most controversially, codified Shariah law in
Brunei and Malaysia now also incorporates elements of Islamic criminal law,
while interpretations of Islam that differ from the authorities’ official doc-
trines are systematically outlawed as ‘‘deviant’’ (sesat). Simultaneously, these
same governments that are restricting civil liberties in the name of divine
legislation expressed their commitment to religious freedom and nondiscrim-
ination by signing the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD) in 2012.
Depending on situational contexts, their political leaders are—in remarkably
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similar ways—using flexible strategies to position themselves in between
human rights and Shariah law. Their arguments range from the claim that
human rights are essentially ‘‘Islamic’’ and fully compatible with Shariah law,
to the accusation that human rights are Western, ‘‘man-made’’ inventions
which are incompatible with God’s legislative commandments, or must be
subordinated to them. In the process of navigating between these two nor-
mative frames of reference, ‘‘human rights’’ is transformed into a polysemic
signifier: one with multiple meanings. Beyond rhetoric and symbolic regional
diplomacy, however, an antipluralistic brand of Islam that systematically
violates the fundamental right to religious freedom is characterizing the
sanction-based standardization of Shariah law in both countries.
This article will first outline some conceptual considerations on the plu-
rality of justificatory grounds for human rights, before sketching the AHRD
and its protection of the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. It will
then explore the dynamics of Shariah politics in Brunei and Malaysia, and
illustrate how Islamic policymakers are connecting the languages of Islamic
law and human rights in paradoxical ways. Finally, the article concludes that
despite some rhetorical hybridization on the surface, the empirical realities of
Islamic governance in contemporary Brunei and Malaysia are hardly recon-
cilable with the ideal-theoretical project of transdoctrinal justifications for
human rights.
CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS: NORMATIVE PLURALITY AND
THE JUSTIFICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
In the face of criticisms of the Western roots, secular underpinnings, and
political exploitation of supposedly ‘‘universal’’ human rights, arguments for
acknowledging the possibility of multiple justificatory grounds, or a plural
justification of human rights, have gained prominence across disciplinary
boundaries. Their proponents disagree with the assumption that human
rights norms can only be justified based on one ‘‘tradition-independent moral
standard,’’1 but they also refuse to abandon human rights on cultural-
relativist grounds. Instead, they argue that even adherents of differing, pos-
sibly even incompatible normative traditions may finally endorse the same
1. David Little, ‘‘Rethinking Human Rights: A Review Essay on Religion, Relativism, and Other
Matters,’’ Journal of Religious Ethics 27, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 151–177, p. 164.
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conception of universally acceptable human rights, albeit for different, yet
internally well-supported reasons.2 If adherents of any given normative tra-
dition reasonably believe that universal human rights are supported by their
tradition, this ‘‘overlapping consensus’’3 could help bridge cultural divides
between groups that commonly appear separated by contrasting doctrines
and premises.
Put differently, a unifying conclusion—universal human rights—could be
derived from mutually incompatible premises. Tore Lindholm refers to the
struggle of liberal Muslim thinkers for a brand of Islam that is compatible
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)—including the
right to religious freedom, equality before the law, and nondiscrimination—
to illustrate the empirical relevance of this argument.4 Leaving aside philo-
sophical controversies about the argument’s messy logical implications, this
article will ask: How does the call for a transdoctrinal, plural justification and
subsequent universal acceptance of human rights resonate with the empirical
realities of Islamic governance in Southeast Asia, particularly in Brunei and
Malaysia? Can we observe tendencies toward an endorsement of the freedom
of thought, conscience, and religion, nondiscrimination, and equality before
the law, as it is stipulated by the UDHR and AHRD? Are compatible con-
clusions derived from two coexisting normative systems? And how is the way
Islamic policymakers are positioning themselves between Shariah law and
human rights embedded in both countries’ wider political landscape?
The fact that human existence is typically shaped by the complexity of
multiple coexisting normativities, or ‘‘legal pluralism,’’ is now commonplace
among scholars of socio-legal studies. Although the empirical diagnosis of
2. Tore Lindholm, ‘‘The Cross–Cultural Legitimacy of Universal Human Rights: Plural Justi-
fication across Normative Divides,’’ in Cultural Human Rights, ed. Martin Scheinin and Francesco
Francioni, 17–39 (London: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), p. 17; see also Abdullahi A. An-Na’im,
‘‘Towards a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining International Standards of Human Rights: The
Meaning of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,’’ in Human Rights in Cross-
Cultural Perspective: A Quest for Consensus, ed. Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, 19–43 (Philadelphia: Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Press, 1992); John Witte and Johan D. van der Vyer (eds.), Religious Human
Rights in Global Perspective: Religious Perspectives (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996), 2 vols.
3. Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, ‘‘The Cultural Mediation of Human Rights: the Al-Arqam Case in
Malaysia,’’ in The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights, ed. Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Beil,
147–168 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 167; Charles Taylor, ‘‘Conditions of an
Unforced Consensus on Human Rights,’’ in East Asian Challenge, pp. 27–60.
4. Lindholm, ‘‘Cross-Cultural Legitimacy,’’ p. 27.
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legal pluralism has almost become a cliche´ after decades of extensive debates,5
it is nevertheless an important premise, particularly as Islamic normativity is
often conceived in static, one-dimensional terms. A second premise refers to
the functional dimension of law as a discursive resource for social actors
(institutional and noninstitutional, powerful and less powerful, dominating
and resisting) to reach certain objectives or justify actions, claims, and deci-
sions. Policymakers, including Islamic ones, may therefore flexibly refer to
one or more—even presumably incompatible—normativities, depending on
their political interests and specific situational requirements.
Franz von Benda-Beckmann has distinguished five different ways in
which social actors flexibly refer to coexisting normativities to pursue
their interests. Although his typology describes a specific empirical context,
namely adat (customary rules) and Islamic norms in Indonesia, it can
insightfully be applied to other settings. Competing actors, or even one and
the same person, may (1) argue within the boundaries of only one norma-
tivity, (2) mobilize two normativities against each other and portray them as
incompatible (or, alternatively, as superior/inferior), (3) combine both nor-
mativities while using them selectively (e.g. by arguing that each normative
order covers different aspects, and that elements of both can be applied
simultaneously wherever appropriate), (4) claim that there is no difference,
as both are actually ‘‘the same,’’ despite being aware of differences between
the two, or (5) creatively transform or compound elements of coexisting
normativities and create new hybrid forms.6 Keeping these diverse strategies
in mind, this article will investigate how the governments of Brunei and
Malaysia are navigating between Islamic law and human rights. But first,
ASEAN’s emerging regional framework for protecting human rights, and
particularly the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, needs
to be sketched.
5. John Griffiths, ‘‘What is Legal Pluralism?’’ Journal of Legal Pluralism 19 (1986), pp. 1–47; Franz
von Benda-Beckmann, Rechtspluralismus in Malawi: Geschichtliche Entwicklung und Heutige Proble-
matik [Legal Pluralism in Malawi: Historical Development and Contemporary Problems] (Mu¨nchen:
Weltforum, 1970); Fernanda Pirie, The Anthropology of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013),
pp. 38ff.
6. Franz von Benda-Beckmann, ‘‘Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?’’ Journal of Legal Pluralism
and Unofficial Law 34, no. 47 (2002): 37–82, pp. 69–70.
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THE ASEAN HUMAN RIGHTS DECLARATION AND ITS
PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS PLURALISM
Political controversies about religion are highly salient in Southeast Asia, as
religious diversity is a characteristic feature of most ASEAN countries, some
of which have decades-long histories of religious, or to some extent religiously
framed, violent conflicts and social tensions. Accommodating religious plu-
rality is thus a crucial challenge for creating a Southeast Asia that is ‘‘pros-
perous and peaceful,’’ as envisioned by the ASEAN Declaration of 1967. The
question of how religious diversity should be dealt with, and under which
normative parameters it should be organized, is at the heart of respective
debates. The ASEAN governments’ strategies for regulating their domestic
religious marketplaces are as diverse as the region itself.7
Originally consisting of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and
Singapore, ASEAN was founded in 1967 with the purpose of creating political
stability and economic progress in the region. Forty years later, now compris-
ing 10 states, including also Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam,
ASEAN received a solid legal foundation with the ASEAN Charter of 2007.
Intense negotiations were held about whether the charter should include
articles on human rights—talks made particularly difficult by the participation
of states notorious for human rights violations and governments that had long
questioned individual human rights on communitarian or cultural-relativist
grounds. Nonetheless, the ASEANCharter finally expressed its member states’
responsibility to protect ‘‘human rights and fundamental freedoms,’’ and
announced the establishment of an ASEAN human rights body.8 The ASEAN
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights was formed in 2009, when
it began drafting an ASEAN human rights document. Three years later, in
November 2012, the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration was presented and
adopted unanimously by all 10member states. Despite well-justified criticisms
that the AHRD is ‘‘a pale shadow of what it could have been,’’9 the declaration
7. For an ASEAN-wide study to which the author contributed, see Human Rights Resource
Centre, Keeping the Faith: A Study of Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion in ASEAN, ed.
Jaclyn Neo (Jakarta: HRRC, 2015).
8. Preamble; Article 1(7); 2(i).
9. Deborah Basham-Jones, ‘‘Asean’s Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights: A Pale
Shadow of What it Could Have Been,’’ Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law 13, no. 2
(2012), pp. 1–26.
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presents an institutionalized regional commitment to clearly defined human
rights that is unprecedented.
Although many details of the AHRD deserve attention, for the purposes
of this article it is sufficient to note that the declaration unambiguously
protects religious freedom and obliges governments to eliminate any form
of religious discrimination. More precisely, Article 22 states that ‘‘every
person has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. All
forms of intolerance, discrimination and incitement of hatred based on
religion and beliefs shall be eliminated.’’ Article 23 adds that ‘‘every person
has the right to freedom of opinion and expression.’’ The AHRD also
affirms equality before the law without distinction of any kind, such as
‘‘religion,’’ ‘‘gender,’’ and ‘‘political or other opinion’’ (Articles 1, 2). Finally,
according to Article 6, it is ‘‘the primary responsibility of all ASEAN mem-
ber states to promote and protect all human rights’’ that are stated in the
AHRD.
To be sure, the AHRD also stipulates noteworthy limitations, which still
reflect the old ‘‘ASEAN way’’10 of emphasizing national sovereignty and
restricting the validity of human rights with reference to cultural particu-
larities and collectivism. Article 6 states that ‘‘the enjoyment of human
rights . . .must be balanced with the performance of corresponding duties’’
toward ‘‘the community and the society where one lives.’’ Accordingly,
although these rights are presented as ‘‘universal’’ and ‘‘indivisible,’’ ‘‘the exer-
cise of human rights . . . shall be subject . . . [to] limitations’’ pertaining to,
among other points, the requirements of ‘‘national security, public order,’’
and ‘‘public morality’’ (Articles 7, 8). Furthermore, the backdoor of cultural
relativism is left half-open by stating that ‘‘the realisation of human rights must
be considered in the regional and national context bearing in mind different
political, economic, legal, social, cultural, historical and religious backgrounds’’
(Article 7, emphasis added). In the cases of Brunei and Malaysia, it is precisely
the latter point that undermines the declaration’s proclaimed protection of
religious freedom, as the following sections will demonstrate.
10. Donald K. Emmerson, ‘‘Critical Terms: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast
Asia,’’ in Hard Choices: Security, Democracy and Regionalism in Southeast Asia, ed. Donald K. Em-
merson, 3–58 (Stanford, CA: Shorenstein APARC, 2008), p. 23.
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ISLAMIC GOVERNANCE IN BRUNEI
The sultanate of Brunei—located on the island of Borneo, with a population
of 420,000–is the only ASEAN country that has unambiguously defined
itself as a nonsecular ‘‘Islamic state’’11 since its Declaration of Independence
from Britain in 1984. Beyond its shores, Brunei appears mainly in the yellow
press, which occasionally carries entertainment-oriented reports about the
sultan (once known as the ‘‘richest man in the world’’) and his extravagant
properties, or colorful royal weddings and rituals. Even in neighboring coun-
tries, there has long been little interest in, or substantial knowledge of,
Brunei’s domestic affairs. This changed when the sultan announced a far-
reaching enforcement of Islamic criminal law in 2013, the Syariah Penal Code
Order 2013 (Perintah Kanun Hukuman Syariah 2013, henceforth SPCO
2013), followed by waves of protest from international human rights organi-
zations and applause from Islamist actors in neighboring countries. Before
describing this legal reform in more detail, some contextual information must
be provided.
Brunei is an Islamic monarchy, governed by a sultan with absolute exec-
utive powers. The present sultan, Hassanal Bolkiah (in office since 1967,
crowned in 1968), is prime minister, minister of finance, minister of defense,
minister of foreign affairs and trade, and head of Islam (or caliph, i.e. ‘‘God’s
vice-regent on earth’’12). There is no parliament, and there are no general
elections. The Legislative Council, which was suspended in 1984, was
re-established in 2004. It has no substantial legislative powers and plays only
an advisory role; the sultan appoints most council members. Accordingly,
Brunei’s political system is a unique polity in Southeast Asia, as it derives its
legitimacy exclusively from a reciprocal patron–client relationship between
an unelected ‘‘caring monarch’’ and his subjects.
Since a traumatic antimonarchical rebellion in 1962 (put down with British
help within two weeks), emergency laws, a strict legal regime, and highly
powerful state institutions have been used to minimize political dissent. After
five decades of systematically depoliticizing the population, there is no
11. Abdul Latif Ibrahim, Issues in Brunei Studies (Bandar Seri Begawan: Akademi Pengajian
Brunei, 2003), p. 197; Abdul Latif Ibrahim, Melayu Islam Beraja: Suatu Pemahaman [Malay Islamic
Monarchy: An Understanding] (Bandar Seri Begawan Pentagram, 2013), pp. 51–52.
12. Constitution of Brunei Darussalam, Part II, Article 2; Ibrahim, Issues in Brunei Studies, p. 205;
Mohd. Zain Serudin, The Malay Islamic Monarchy: A Closer Understanding (Bandar Seri Begawan:
MTMIB, 2013), p. 23.
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opposition group left, neither organized as a political party nor as civil society
actors. The mediascape, including cyberspace, is under sophisticated control.
Brunei’s didactic news media serve to promulgate the government’s posi-
tions, including its religious policies. Political stability is strengthened by
exceptional living standards. Brunei ranks 31st in the Human Development
Index 2015; it is the world’s highest-ranked Muslim-majority country. Large
oil and gas resources have enabled the creation of a generous welfare state.
The sultan enjoys the image of a benevolent leader, which is also intensely
fostered by the state-controlled media. Citizens benefit from extraordinary
social security, including zero income tax, free health care, free education,
and subsidized housing. The sultan annually gives thousands of personal gifts
(kurnia peribadi) on the occasion of Hari Raya Aidil Fitri, the end of the
fasting month, to citizens, who can send their wishes to the palace or hand
over envelopes during his frequent public appearances.
The ruling family’s official genealogy, dating back to the fourteenth cen-
tury, presents Sultan Hassanal Bokiah as Brunei’s 29th Muslim ruler and
a descendant of Prophet Muhammad. The population’s majority are ethnic
Malay (65.7%), and 78.8% of Brunei is Muslim. The government portrays
the sultanate’s six-century history of absolute rule as a distinctly Malay cul-
tural tradition that must be protected from dangerous foreign influences.
These historical, religious, and ethnic dimensions of justifying the ruling
order are enshrined in an official ‘‘state ideology’’ called Melayu Islam Beraja
(Malay Islamic Monarchy), or MIB.
MIB was announced in 1984, when the sultan declared that Brunei shall
‘‘forever be a Malay Islamic Monarchy.’’ Described interchangeably as
a ‘‘national philosophy,’’ ‘‘concept of the nation,’’ and ‘‘ideology,’’ MIB rests
on three pillars defining the core of prescribed national identity: Melayu
(Malayness), Islam, and Beraja (Monarchy). In this triangle, the Islamic aspect
is considered supreme.13 Critical scholars, none of whom is a Bruneian citizen,
have deconstructed MIB as a twentieth-century nation-building project,
an ‘‘ideological construct’’ that has been ‘‘exploited’’ for self-legitimization.14
13. Ibrahim, Issues in Brunei Studies, p. 206; Ibrahim,Melayu Islam Beraja, p. xxxiii; Zain Serudin,
Melayu Islam Beraja: Suatu Pendekatan [Malay Islamic Monarchy: An Approach] (Bandar Seri
Begawan: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1996), p. xi.
14. Tsung Hang Tey, ‘‘Brunei: Entrenching an Absolute Monarchy,’’ in Constitutionalism in
Southeast Asia, vol. 2, ed. Clauspeter Hill and Jo¨rg Menzel, 7–35 (Singapore: Konrad Adenauer
Stiftung, 2008), p. 34; G. Braighlinn, Ideological Innovation under Monarchy: Aspects of Legitimation
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Bruneian scholars respond that notwithstanding the term’s recent invention, it
appropriately describes the authentic nature of the sultanate’s centuries-old
tradition.15 MIB serves as a sacrosanct political and cultural imperative. On all
levels of the education sector, compulsoryMIBcourses are taught, and laudatory
reference to MIB is a discursively naturalized element of official public life—it is
a general norm, practiced by and expected frommost citizens and institutions, to
regularly stress the importance of the national ideology. News media serve to
re-actualize this norm on a daily basis. Government institutions frequently
organize events to propagateMIB, whereas non-governmental actors, including
commercial companies, habitually present their work as a ‘‘service to MIB’’ and
thereby express their commitment to ‘‘good citizenship,’’ as the government
defines and expects it. Brunei society is typically described as ‘‘apathetic,’’
‘‘depoliticized,’’ and ‘‘contented, even docile.’’16 Such notions express an unde-
niable tendency, although they blend out forms of dissent and refusal of obedi-
ence to the government’s official truth claims that still exist beyond the surface.17
Brunei’s constitutional religion is Sunni Islam of the Shafi’i legal school.
Religious minorities include Christians, Buddhists, and smaller numbers of
Hindus, Sikhs, Taoists, Baha’is, and animists. The government seeks to ensure
‘‘national harmony’’ under Muslim Malay supremacy. It celebrates ‘‘cultural
diversity,’’ with ethnic minorities staging cultural performances on festive occa-
sions. Plurality, however, does not mean pluralism. In recent years the sultan
has repeatedly condemned ‘‘religious pluralism’’ and ‘‘liberal Islam’’ as ‘‘devia-
tionism’’ that ‘‘will never be related to Brunei.’’18 Accordingly, MIB considers
-
Activity in Contemporary Brunei (Amsterdam: VU Press, 1991); Geoffrey C. Gunn, Language, Power
and Ideology in Brunei Darussalam (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1997); Sven Schottmann,
‘‘Melayu Islam Beraja: The Politics of Legitimisation in a Malay Islamic Monarchy,’’ Review of
Indonesian and Malay Affairs 40, no. 2 (2006), pp. 111–39.
15. Serudin, Melayu Islam Beraja, p. 45; Ibrahim, Issues in Brunei Studies, p. 200.
16. A. V. M. Horton, ‘‘Brunei National Democratic Party,’’ in Southeast Asia: A Historical Ency-
clopedia, From Angkor Wat to East Timor, ed. Ooi Keat Gin (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2004), p. 274;
Andrew Tan, ‘‘Brunei Security Perspectives,’’ in Security Perspectives of the Malay Archipelago, ed.
Andrew Tan, 87–110 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004), p. 99; Mohamad Yusop, ‘‘Brunei Darussa-
lam: Towards a New Era,’’ Southeast Asian Affairs 2007 (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007), pp. 103–13.
17. Regrettably, such forms of non-compliance have received very little, if any, scholarly attention
in recent years. For an anthropological account, see Dominik M. Mu¨ller, ‘‘Sharia Law and the
Politics of ‘Faith Control’ in Brunei Darussalam: Dynamics of Socio-Legal Change in a Southeast
Asian Sultanate,’’ Internationales Asienforum 46, no. 3/4 (2015), pp. 313–45.
18. ‘‘Call to Shun Deviant Beliefs, Follow Prophet’s Teachings,’’ Brunei Direct (Bandar Seri
Begawan, Brunei Darusslam), November 15, 2012; ‘‘Muslims Urged Not to be Swayed by Guises of
Islamic Liberalism,’’ Brunei Times, February 9, 2013.
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loyal non-Muslims and non-Malays ‘‘protected minorities,’’ but excludes them
from desirable national identity.
While non-Muslim religions can be practiced, with restrictions, interpreta-
tions of Islam other than MIB-style Sunni Shafi’i are even further restricted.
Historically, Brunei was ahead of the regional trend of outlawing ‘‘deviant
sects,’’ a phenomenon that is presently causing great concern in Malaysia
(ajaran sesat) and Indonesia (aliran sesat). During the tenure of State Mufti
(the country’s highest-ranking Islamic official and interpreter of Islamic Law)
Ismail Omar Abdul Aziz (1962–93), Brunei started codifying a list of ‘‘deviant’’
groups, nowadays including e.g. the Ahmadiyyah (banned 1970), Baha’i
(banned 1970), Tarekat Mufarridiyah (banned 1979), Al-Arqam (banned
1991), Shia Islam, and the teachings of certain individuals.19 Al-Arqam, a reviv-
alist orthodox Islamic movement which gained support among educated elites,
was banned three years before it was more prominently outlawed in its country
of origin, Malaysia, in 1994. In addition to being viewed as a political threat,
members of the Arqam community believed that its leader, Abuya Ashaari
Mohammad (who died in 2010), was blessed by Allah with various supernat-
ural powers and was able to communicate with the Prophet Muhammad
through another deceased intermediary, Syeikh Muhammad As-Suhaimi,
among other theologically controversial claims. Brunei’s ‘‘faith/doctrine con-
trol’’ (kawalan aqidah) policies are executed by religious enforcement agencies,
police, and intelligence services. There are 24-hour ‘‘hotlines’’ for citizens to
report ‘‘deviant’’ individuals. Institutions responsible for the definition, control,
and administration of Islam include the Ministry of Religious Affairs, State
Mufti Department, Religious Council (the ‘‘chief authority’’ in ‘‘all matters
relating to religion’’20), the Religious Council’s Legal Committee (headed by
the state mufti, whose fatwas are legally binding), Syariah [Shariah] Affairs
Department, Faith Control Section, and several sub-institutions.
In contrast to other Muslim-majority countries, Brunei’s Islamic policies
‘‘are discussed internally and . . . introduced slowly and quietly. Open reli-
gious polemics and debates have never taken place.’’21 Without ever being
openly questioned by organized secular or Islamist critics, the government’s
19. Mu¨ller, ‘‘Sharia Law,’’ p. 327.
20. Religious Council and Kadis Courts Act, Article 38.
21. Iik Arifin Mansurnoor, 2002, ‘‘Islam in Brunei Darussalam and Global Islam: An Analysis of
their Interaction,’’ in Islam in the Era of Globalization: Muslim Attitudes towards Modernity and
Identity, ed. Johan Meuleman, 71–98 (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), p. 88.
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clergy has established an officialized state interpretation of Islam as an
unquestionable Muslim truth, strengthened by systematic indoctrination and
the threat of sanctions for transgressions. Contents of Friday prayers are
carefully prescribed, and Islamic preachers are required to obtain government
licenses. Unlike in Malaysia, no politician or social actor has ever publicly
suggested or demanded that Brunei be ‘‘secular.’’
Brunei’s Shariah legislation has long been based on a dual legal system, in
which Islamic and British-derived laws coexist. Before the colonial era, the
monarchy was organized under interrelated Shariah and customary law, cod-
ified as Hukum Kanun Brunei (Code of Laws of Brunei) alongside Hukum
Resam and Adat Istiadat (Customary Laws).22 The British administration
paved the way for a more systematic form of Shariah-based governance. Under
Indirect Rule, British colonial advisors encouraged a ‘‘modern’’ codification of
Islamic law and related institution building, starting in 1912 and continuing
throughout the Residency period.23 Although most Bruneian scholars perceive
colonialism as a secular or ‘‘infidel’’ disturbance of a previously existing ‘‘com-
plete’’ Islamic order,24 and while colonial Shariah law was indeed largely limited
to family law, the British-supported legacy of institutionalization and legalism
created the foundation of today’s powerful Islamic bureaucracy.25
22. An Islamic penal code existed in Brunei prior to the British arrival in 1888; see Mahmdud
Seadon Othman, Perlaksanaan dan Pentadbiran Undang-Undang Islam di Negara Brunei Darussa-
lam: Satu Tinjauan [Implementation and Administration of Islamic Laws in Brunei Darussalam:
A Review] (Bandar Seri Begawan: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1996), pp. 99–100. Hudud-based
cutting off of thieves’ hands, for example, was practiced at least occasionally; see Mahmdud Seadon
Othman, Ke Arah Perlaksanaan Undang-Undang Islam di Negara Brunei Darussalam [Towards the
Administration of Islamic Laws in Brunei Darussalam] (Bandar Seri Begawan: UBD, 2001), pp. 2ff.
Accordingly, the SPCO 2013 is framed as ‘‘a continuation’’ of a law that was first introduced in
Brunei in the sixteenth century but ‘‘was abruptly halted’’ by colonialism (‘‘Syariah Penal Code Not
New to Brunei,’’ Brunei Times, January 12, 2014). Other sources, however, describe certain reg-
ulations and punishments that have no basis in Islamic teachings.
23. Indirect rule was a colonial strategy and system of government used in large parts of the
British Empire in India, Africa, and Southeast Asia, wherein pre-colonial power structures were not
entirely destroyed. In colonial Malaya and Brunei, the British retained existing sultanates but limited
the rulers’ authority to Islamic affairs and Malay customs, and ‘‘assisted’’ their work through colonial
‘‘advisors.’’ This approach was considered easier, less expensive, and more effective. Brunei was given
the status of a British Protectorate in 1888, and the first locally stationed British resident, Malcom S.
H. McArthur, was appointed in 1906 as a colonial manager and advisor to the sultan.
24. Ibrahim, Issues in Brunei Studies, p. 101; Othman, Ke Arah Perlaksanaan, pp. 2ff.
25. Iik Arifin Mansurnoor, ‘‘Formulating and Implementing a Shari’a-Guided Legal System in
Brunei Darussalam: Opportunity and Challenge,’’ Sosiohumanika 1, no. 2 (2009), pp. 219–48;
Mu¨ller, ‘‘Sharia Law,’’ p. 321.
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After independence, the Shariah sector was further empowered, fueled by
transnational Islamic revivalism, ideological developments within Brunei’s
Islamic bureaucracy,26 power-political considerations, and the growing piety
of the aging sultan, Hassanal Bokiah. Since 1990, non-Shariah laws have been
systematically reviewed to ensure that they do not conflict with Islamic
norms.27 Prior to 2014, Shariah law applied exclusively to Muslims, whereas
non-Shariah law was applicable to all citizens. This dual system has been
altered by the SPCO 2013, which includes certain provisions for non-
Muslims, including punishments such as imprisonment, and even the death
penalty (e.g. for insulting Prophet Muhammad). The government has
defined its new legal system as ‘‘hybrid,’’28 and claims that enforcing the
SPCO 2013 will lead to a complete implementation of Islamic law. It will
be enacted over three stages. The first started on May 1, 2014, and includes
55 ‘‘general offences’’ (ta’zir) that can be punished with monetary fines and
imprisonment. Heavier punishments (hudud/qisas) such as the death penalty
by stoning and the amputation of limbs will gradually be implemented in the
second and third phase, which will take effect 12 and 24 months after the
Syariah Courts Criminal Procedure Code (CPC), now in draft form, is
gazetted. In addition, 209 amendments were made to Brunei’s earlier Islamic
legislation. In January 2016, the sultan sharply criticized the Ministry of
Religious Affairs for not having finalized the CPC yet. Minister of Religious
Affairs Awang Badaruddin (who was just recently appointed) publicly apol-
ogized and pointed to the project’s challenging organizational complexities
(‘‘something totally new’’). He declared June 2016 the target for gazetting
the CPC and June 2017 for the SPCO’s phase 2.29 The former minister,
Mohammad Abd. Rahman, had been removed from his office following
a cabinet reshuffle in October 2015.
When international observers became aware of the reform in early
2014, the sultanate received unprecedented attention. American celebrities
staged demonstrations in front of a luxurious hotel owned by the sultan in
26. For a more detailed account of this process, see Mu¨ller, ‘‘Sharia Law.’’
27. ‘‘Laws to Be Brought in Line with Islam,’’ Brunei Darussalam Newsletter 60 (September 1990),
p. 1.
28. ‘‘Unique Hybrid Legal System Mooted,’’ Brunei Times (Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei),
January 5, 2012.
29. ‘‘Gov’t Targets Syariah CPC Completion by June,’’ Brunei Times, February 28, 2016; ‘‘Buat
bersungguh-sungguh’’ [Act Earnestly], Media Permata (Gadong, Brunei), February 29, 2016.
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Beverly Hills, California, that had long been popular among actors, to protest
the ‘‘barbaric’’ human rights violations that Brunei’s new law allegedly
implied. As a comprehensive description would go beyond the scope of this
article, only some of the most controversial provisions of the law will be
mentioned:
 The SPCO 2013 stipulates that any person who insults the Prophet
Muhammad and refuses to repent can be sentenced to death, or alter-
natively to 30 years’ imprisonment and caning.30
 Anyone who insults or ‘‘makes fun of’’ Islamic teachings, practices, laws,
or the State Mufti’s fatwas can be imprisoned for three years.31
 Contempt of members of the Shariah administration is punishable by
up to two years in prison.32
 The public dissemination of beliefs or practices that are considered
contrary to Islamic law, or exposing Muslims to ceremonies, acts or
doctrines that contradict Islamic law, is punishable by up to five years in
prison.33
 Muslims who declare themselves God or prophet, and Muslims who
deny the validity of the hadith (reports describing the sayings and ac-
tions of the Prophet and his companions, which in Islamic jurispru-
dence traditionally serve as a source of Shariah law) can be punished by
death.34
 Muslims who worship ‘‘any person, place, nature or any object, thing or
animal in any manner’’ contrary to Islamic law (e.g. by believing that
objects or animals possess certain powers, ‘‘increase wealth,’’ ‘‘heal dis-
eases’’ or ‘‘bring good luck’’) can be imprisoned and forced to undergo
religious ‘‘counseling.’’35
 Not attending Friday prayers is a criminal offense.36
 Islamic preaching and teaching without a permit can be punished by up
to two years’ imprisonment.37
30. SPCO 2013, 110 (1), 221 (1, 2).
31. Ibid., 220.
32. Ibid., 230 (2).
33. Ibid., 207.
34. Ibid., 108, 109, 111 (1, b,).
35. Ibid., 216 (1).
36. Ibid., 194.
37. Ibid., 229 (1).
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 Extramarital sex (zina) is punishable for Muslims by stoning to death,
whipping, or, if certain procedural conditions are not met, up to seven
years’ imprisonment.38
 Pregnancy or childbirth out of wedlock can be punished by two years in
prison.39
 Muslims and non-Muslims can receive the death penalty for homosex-
ual intercourse, or intercourse ‘‘against the order of nature that is
through the anus.’’40
 Muslim apostates can also be punished with death by stoning, or up to
30 years’ imprisonment and whipping, if they refuse to repent.41
 Non-Muslims are not allowed to proselytize and cannot disseminate
religious literature. Teaching non-Muslim religions or alternative inter-
pretations of Islam in schools is forbidden.
Notably, several of these offenses were also forbidden before the legal
reform. However, the punishments have been drastically increased, and addi-
tional provisions have been added. The government strongly emphasizes the
procedural principle of doubt42 on the part of the accused, which makes it
difficult to convict persons who refuse to make voluntary confessions, and
various mechanisms for repentance and the lifting of sentences. It remains to
be seen how the SPCO will finally be enacted in practice. At present, judges
are being trained, and the Sultan Sharif Ali Islamic University has introduced
a new diploma called Shariah Criminal Justice System for law enforcement
officers and students, in addition to a B.A. program with the same title.
The legal reform’s announcement resulted in popular uncertainties that
were highly unusual by Bruneian standards. As a reaction, the government
held numerous events across the country—attended by ‘‘over 40,000 peo-
ple,’’ 10% of the population—to educate them about the new law.43 Initially,
some Bruneians expressed concerns anonymously in online discussion for-
ums and the comments section of online newspapers. However, when one
38. Ibid., 68 (1), 69 (1, a, b), 69 (2, a).
39. Ibid., 94 (1, a).
40. Ibid., 82 (1, 2).
41. Ibid., 112 (1); ‘‘Apostasy Punishable by Death,’’ Brunei Times, April 2, 2013.
42. On the importance of the principle of doubt (or the ‘‘art not to punish’’) in the legal theory
and history of Islamic criminal law, see Intisar A. Rabb, Doubt in Islamic Law: A History of Legal
Maxims, Interpretation, and Islamic Criminal Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
43. ‘‘Over 40,000 People Briefed on Syariah,’’ Brunei Times, May 1, 2014.
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citizen used his real name in 2013, the government used the case to make an
example.
Shortly after the sultan first announced the legal reform, a reader’s letter
questioning whether stoning to death and flogging were obligatory in Islam,
as the Qur’an made no such prescription, was sent to a local newspaper.44
The author, clearly a committed Muslim, argued that the maximum pun-
ishment for adultery should be 100 lashes. Strangely enough, the letter was
printed, but the authorities reacted immediately. First, the Ministry of Reli-
gious Affairs published a response article explaining why enforcing such
penalties was unquestionably obligatory. The article ended with an ‘‘invita-
tion’’ to the author to visit the Ministry for further ‘‘explanations.’’ Shortly
afterwards, the state mufti publicly warned of a deviationist ‘‘anti-hadith
movement’’ that denied Prophetic traditions and referred to the Qur’an
without theological knowledge.45
While visiting Bruneian students in New Zealand the same week, the
sultan condemned the supposed ‘‘anti-hadith-movement’’ that was ‘‘secretly
desecrating the Islamic laws.’’46 The mufti’s following Friday prayer sermon
warned of ‘‘orientalist’’ and ‘‘liberalist’’ ideas that were spread by ideological
descendants of a ‘‘pre-Islamic tribe,’’ the Khawarij, that vehemently opposed
the Shariah laws. The letter’s author was finally sued for heresy, and ‘‘given an
explanation by the religious authority . . .with the cooperation of the Internal
Security Department,’’ Brunei’s domestic intelligence service.47 The case was
settled after he publicly repented at a Shariah Court, widely covered by state-
controlled media. The government’s Islamic authorities declared that ‘‘the
next move would be to help’’ him ‘‘deepen his knowledge of Islam.’’
Although the criminal charges were dropped due to his repentance and there
was no other penalty, he apparently ‘‘agreed voluntarily’’ to attend the Islamic
authorities’ ‘‘faith purification counselling’’ program. Obviously, his right to
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, as stated in the AHRD, was
violated in the name of divine normativity.
44. ‘‘Should We Resort to Stoning or Flogging’’ (Opinion), Brunei Times, March 13, 2013.
45. ‘‘The Punishment of Stoning for a Muhshan Exists in Islamic Law,’’ Borneo Bulletin (Gadong,
Brunei), March 23, 2013; ‘‘Apostasy Punishable by Death,’’ Brunei Times, April 1, 2013.
46. ‘‘Beware of Deviant Groups: Imams,’’ Brunei Times, March 30, 2013.
47. ‘‘Confession, Repentance for Questioning Islamic Law,’’ Brunei Times, June 8, 2013; cf.
Mu¨ller, ‘‘Sharia Law,’’ p. 326.
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Other structural violations of the AHRD are related to the fundamental
right to equality before the law. Brunei’s legal system ascribes different legal
status to Muslims and non-Muslims, and to men and women. For example,
only a Muslim can become prime minister, and in village council elections—
the only public elections held in Brunei—all candidates must be Muslims.48
Although Brunei’s Islamic Family Law Act generally supports equal rights for
men and women, the inheritance proportion for Muslim women is half that
of men, justified by Islamic sources. Furthermore, in some Shariah Court
cases, the testimony of one male witness has the same status as that of two
female witnesses.49
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has stated
that the SPCO 2013 seriously violates international human rights law.
In response to such criticisms, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah argued that his
government ‘‘uphold[s] human rights with the Al-Quran as our foothold.’’50
At ASEAN events, the sultan has emphasized his government’s promotion of
human rights;51 indeed, his government hosted the 13th Meeting of the
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights in Brunei in
2013. Translated into Benda-Beckmann’s typology, the sultan does not argue
only within the boundaries of one normativity, nor does he mobilize two
normative orders against each other and portray them as incompatible.
Instead, he combines both normativities and uses them selectively depending
on situational context, while on the level of domestic policies making clear
that Islamic law is superior. However, his statements can also be read as
suggesting that both normativities are actually the same, thereby ‘‘bridging’’
or ‘‘hybridizing’’ the two.
State Mufti Abdul Aziz Juned, one of Brunei’s most powerful law and
policymakers, explained in October 2013 that ‘‘Islam has its own human rights’’
which, in contrast to human rights claims ‘‘stipulated by humans,’’ would
‘‘never change through the times.’’52 In his view, the only human rights that
are universal are ‘‘stated in Syariah law.’’ Unlike the sultan, he emphasized
48. Human Rights Resource Centre, Keeping the Faith, p. 61.
49. SPCO 2013, 141 (1b, c), 148 (1b, c).
50. ‘‘UN Concerned at Broad Application of Death Penalty in Brunei’s Revised Penal Code,’’
UN News Center, April 11, 2014; ‘‘Laws of Islam Seek Blessings Not Oppression,’’ Borneo Bulletin,
November 5, 2013.
51. ‘‘HM Lauds ASEAN Role in Promoting Democracy,’’ Brunei Times, November 12, 2013; see
also ‘‘Brunei to Attend Human Rights Meeting,’’ Brunei Times, April 28, 2014.
52. ‘‘Syariah Law Not against Human Rights,’’ Borneo Bulletin, October 24, 2013.
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a fundamental difference between ‘‘man-made’’ human rights and Islamic law,
and mobilized both normativities against each other while simultaneously
claiming that ‘‘real’’ human rights and Shariah law are ‘‘the same.’’ Brunei’s
government has also explicated its hybridized reinterpretation of ‘‘human
rights’’ at the UN Human Rights Council, explaining that the SPCO 2013
aims ‘‘at providing basic human rights.’’53 Depending on situations and target
audiences, however, the emphasis varies. In the following section, it will be
shown that although Brunei is in many ways a unique polity in the region,
there are some striking similarities with Malaysia’s Islamic governance and its
leaders’ paradoxical approach to human rights.
ISLAMIC GOVERNANCE IN MALAYSIA
Malaysia is the second ASEAN country where Islam is the state’s official
religion, as stipulated by Article 3 of the Constitution of 1957. In the pre-
colonial era, Islam had played an important political role, dating back to the
Sultanate of Malacca in the fifteenth century. Under colonial rule, the British
administration granted far-reaching autonomy to the Malay sultans in mat-
ters related to Islam and Malay customary law. Accordingly, Islamic gover-
nance has long been integral to ‘‘the traditional identity of the polity.’’54
Post-colonial Malaysia is multi-religious and multi-ethnic, with more than
one-third of the population being non-Muslim, mainly ethnic Chinese and
persons of South Asian origin (‘‘Indians’’). The constitution states that ethnic
Malays (50–55% of the population)—privileged as bumiputera (‘‘sons/princes
of the soil’’)—are necessarily Muslims. Two political parties, the leading
government party United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), which
has ruled Malaysia since Independence in 1957, and the Islamist opposition
party, Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (Islamic Party of Malaysia, PAS), have competed
for decades over Muslim Malay votes, which are the crucial prerequisite for
national political power. Despite Islam’s constitutional role, UMNO initially
conceptualized Malaysia as a secular state, a position that was consistently
53. UN Human Rights Council (Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review), 19th ses-
sion, ‘‘National Report Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of the Annex to Human Rights
Council Resolution 16/21 [Brunei Darussalam],’’ April 28–May 9, 2014, p. 3.
54. Dian A. H. Shah, ‘‘Constitutional Arrangements on Religion and Religious Freedom in
Malaysia and Indonesia: Furthering or Inhibiting Rights?’’ Indonesian Journal of International &
Comparative Law 1, no. 1 (January 2014): 260–99, p. 265.
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upheld by the first prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman (tenure 1957–
1970).55 PAS, in contrast, has rejected the notion of secularism since its for-
mation in 1951.
UMNO’s claim of secularism began to crumble during the tenure of
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad (in office 1981–2003), which coincided
with the increasing local popularity of Islamic revivalism (Malay: kebangkitan
Islam), a transnational trend of calling for an all-encompassing Islamization
and de-secularization of states and societies, which was accelerated by several
developments in the Middle East and North Africa, most prominently the
Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1978–79. Mahathir’s (pseudo)democratically
elected administration integrated Islamist activists and ideas, which led to
various Islamization policies and a shift to an Islamic vocabulary in UMNO’s
political rhetoric, particularly when addressing domestic and international
Muslim audiences.
Several new Islamic laws were enforced, with 122 enactments and ordi-
nances across the country’s regional states (negeri) until 2005. (Notably,
Malaysia’s administration of Islamic affairs is federally organized, and each
state has its own Shariah bureaucracy and legislation.) While during the
colonial and early post-colonial era Malaysia’s Shariah law was mainly limited
to personal law (e.g. marriage and inheritance), the Mahathir government
widened the Shariah sector. It gradually also enforced some elements of
Islamic criminal law, albeit to varying degrees in different negeri (federal
states). An increasingly influential Islamic bureaucracy organizes the admin-
istration of Islamic law. Accordingly, Liow argues that although PAS is
commonly portrayed as Malaysia’s Islamist force, the once secular-oriented
UMNO-led government has become an Islamist actor as well, utilizing the
state as a ‘‘vehicle of Islamization.’’56 In fact, nowadays no UMNO politician
openly argues for secularism.
UMNO’s appropriation of Islamist ideology evolved vis-a`-vis PAS’s oppo-
sitional calls for a comprehensive ‘‘Islamic’’ order. By 1982–83, when young,
Middle East–trained Islamist reformists took over PAS’s leadership, a process
began that became known as the PAS–UMNO ‘‘Islamization race.’’57
55. Ibid, p. 269.
56. Joseph C. Liow, Piety and Politics: Islamism in Contemporary Malaysia (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2009), p. 181.
57. Farish A. Noor, Islam Embedded: The Historical Development of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic
Party PAS (1951–2003) (Kuala Lumpur: MSRI, 2004), p. 724.
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Mahathir sought to undermine Islamist opposition by centralizing Islamic
discourse and initiating a political Islamization program from above. PAS,
however, rejected UMNO’s Islamization as hypocritical. The question of
how Islamic law should be implemented became a key topic in Malay political
debates. The UMNO government has always rejected PAS’s calls for a type of
Islamic penal code (hudud/qisas)—such as is now enforced in Brunei—while
the aspiration for hudud laws became a constitutive identity marker for PAS.
Despite UMNO’s rejection of hudud, Islamist ideological positions have
gradually moved from the margins to the mainstream of Malay political
discourse across party-political boundaries,58 to the discontent of Malaysia’s
traditionally marginalized non-Muslim population.
Over the last three decades, the UMNO-led government has standardized
an antipluralistic brand of Islam while outlawing alternative interpretations as
‘‘deviant teachings’’—in a manner that closely resembles Brunei’s treatment
of intra-Muslim diversity outlined above. The UMNO-sponsored Islamic
bureaucracy has become an influential, in fact largely untouchable, political
player operating in part beyond democratic control. Once gazetted, the state
muftis’ fatwas become binding and enforceable without going through the
usual legislative process. Syariah crimes (jenayah Syariah) are now being
prosecuted in several Malaysian states by Islamic enforcement agencies,
which conduct various forms of moral policing and intrusions into the private
life of Muslims. This pertains for example to the consumption of alcohol,
sexual contacts of unmarried couples, homosexual intercourse, ‘‘indecent’’
public behavior, and ‘‘falsifications of Islam,’’ all also illegal in Brunei. Reli-
gious officers regularly raid hotels and nightclubs across Malaysia, with the
notable exception of Kuala Lumpur’s tourist areas. In contrast to Brunei,
however, Shariah law still applies exclusively to Muslims.
Adherents of ‘‘deviant teachings,’’ such as Shi’ite Muslims, are under close
surveillance. In one of several instances, more than 100 Shi’ite Muslims were
arrested while celebrating Ashura (the day of ritually commemorating the
martyrdom of the third Shi’ite imam, Husayn Ibn Ali) in Gombak in 2010.
Shi’ite Islam is formally banned in 11 of 14Malaysian states, based on a ruling
issued by the Fatwa Committee of the National Council for Islamic Affairs in
58. The vice president of Malaysia’s second Malay-dominated opposition party, PKR, told the
author that his party generally supports the implementation of Shariah law, although it may disagree
with UMNO and PAS over details (interview with Shamsul Iskandar, Kuala Lumpur, March 8,
2010).
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1996. Similarly, the Ahmadiyyah community was banned from calling itself
Muslim and holding Friday prayers at its mosques; the effort included erec-
tion by government religious authorities of a signboard at a mosque stating
that Ahmadiyyah is ‘‘not Muslim.’’ Founded in India in the late 19th century,
the Ahmadiyyah defends an apolitical, categorically pacifist interpretation of
Islam, summed up in its slogan ‘‘love for all, hatred for none.’’ The group is
banned and persecuted in several countries, including Malaysia and Brunei,
primarily for theological reasons, most notably because its founder, Mirza
Ghulam Ahmad, is alleged to be venerated as a prophet after Muhammad.
Several Muslims have been sentenced to jail terms and ‘‘re-education’’ in
‘‘faith purification centers’’ (pusat pemurnian akidah baitul iman). In 2009,
a self-declared ‘‘Malay prophet’’ who questioned the obligation to do the hajj
(pilgrimage to Mecca) was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment, including six
months at a religious rehabilitation center. He was found guilty of five
charges under the Selangor Syariah Criminal Enactment of 1995, namely
sections 7 (False doctrine), 8 (False claim), 10 (Insulting or bringing into
contempt the religion), 12 (Contempt of religious authorities), and 12 (Opin-
ion contrary to fatwa). In 2011, the first Shariah-based canings for ‘‘illicit sex’’
took place, albeit not yet under Brunei-style hudud legislation.59
During a religious event in 2012, Prime Minister Najib Razak (who took
office in 2009) declared that ‘‘liberalism’’ and ‘‘pluralism’’ were ‘‘among the
biggest threats faced by Muslims in the nation today.’’60 He added that
‘‘despite universal values being shared by all, matters relating to the aqidah
[belief] must be defended and there is no compromise on this.’’ Former
Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin (who was dramatically sacked
from his position in 2015 by Najib after criticizing the latter’s alleged role
in a corruption scandal) similarly argued that ‘‘people will no longer live
harmoniously and through religious guidance if ideologies like liberalism . . .
are allowed to spread.’’61 Furthermore, pluralism and liberalism would lead
to numerous ‘‘sins,’’ such as ‘‘free mingling of the sexes, same sex marriages,
59. ‘‘‘Malay Prophet’ Sentenced to 10 Years Jail, Six Lashes, RM16,500 Fine,’’ Malaysian Insider
(Petaling Jaya, Malaysia), October 22, 2009; ‘‘3 Women Caned for Having Illicit Sex,’’ The Star
(Petaling Jaya, Malaysia), February 18, 2010.
60. ‘‘PM Warns of Liberalism, Pluralism,’’ New Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia),
November 9, 2012.
61. ‘‘DPM: No Harmony if Liberalism and Pluralism Allowed to Spread,’’ Edge Malaysia (Pe-
taling Jaya, Malaysia), October 9, 2012.
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apostasy and deviant behaviour . . . in the name of individual freedom and
human rights.’’ The government’s ulama (religious scholars with formal
education in Islamic studies) are systematically promulgating the same posi-
tion. The pro-UMNO cleric Ismail Mina Ahmad, for example, has demonized
‘‘religious pluralism’’ as a ‘‘satanic movement that makes the Muslim commu-
nity become infidel.’’62 The state-Islamic institution JAKIM (Jabatan Kema-
juan Islam Malaysia, Department of Islamic Advancement of Malaysia) has
recently compared the threat of ‘‘liberalism’’ to that of the Islamic State of
Syria/Iraq, and called for jihad against both. At a conference on ‘‘de-radicali-
zation,’’ a JAKIM representative added ‘‘pluralism’’ and ‘‘LGBT’’ to the list.63
To be sure, a wide range of civil society actors is criticizing the govern-
ment’s Islamic bureaucracy for various reasons, and—unlike in Brunei—it is
still possible to openly disagree with the government’s religious paternalistic
truth claims. Most prominently, Islamic reformist groups such as Sisters in
Islam and the Islamic Renaissance Front are tirelessly arguing for tolerance,
acknowledgement of plurality, and equal rights within a Shariah-based nor-
mative framework. However, they are in an increasingly marginalized posi-
tion, enjoy very little grass-roots support (unlike the governmental clergy’s
positions, or those of PAS), and have few (if any) allies left among Malaysia’s
political elites. Some critics of Malaysia’s Islamic governance have faced
blasphemy charges, arrests, and various forms of harassment by state and
nonstate actors in recent years.64
In a much-discussed statement read at the 57th national-level Quran
Recital Assembly in 2014, Prime Minister Najib stated that ‘‘Human Right-
ism’’ is a ‘‘threat’’ to Islamic values, as its ‘‘core beliefs are based on humanism
and secularism as well as liberalism.’’ He further stated that ‘‘Human Right-
ism’’ is ‘‘deviationist in that it glorifies the desires of man alone and rejects any
value system that encompasses religious norms,’’ while affirming that his
62. Ismail Mina Ahmad, Pluralisme Agama: Satu Gerakan Iblis Memurtadkan Umma [Religious
Pluralism: A Satanic Movement that Makes the Muslim Community Become Infidel] (Kuala
Lumpur: MUAFAKAT, 2012); see also ‘‘Islamic Scholars: Fight Pluralism Concept,’’ Malaysian
Insider, November 18, 2012.
63. ‘‘In Friday Sermon, JAKIM Calls for jihad against Liberals, IS,’’Malay Mail Online (Petaling
Jaya, Malaysia), March 20, 2015; ‘‘JAKIM: Liberals, Pluralists Have Potential to Be Radicalised,’’
Malaysiakini (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia), January 26, 2016.
64. See e.g. ‘‘Civil Court Throws Out Kassim Ahmad’s Bid to Challenge Decision Charging
Him with Insulting Islam,’’ Borneo Post (Kuching, Malaysia), July 15, 2014; ‘‘Ulamas Accuse Six of
Denigrating Islam,’’ New Straits Times, February 4, 2002.
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government would never tolerate LGBT rights and apostasy, ‘‘or deny Mus-
lims their right to be governed by Shariah Courts.’’ Only a few days later,
however, the prime minister told the Malaysian Association for the Pro-
motion of Human Rights that, ‘‘as Malaysians, we believe in human rights,
and subscribe to the philosophy, concepts and norms of the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights.’’65 Like the government of Brunei, Najib
is using diverse strategies, adjusted to diverse target audiences. In the first
statement, addressed to a pious audience at a religious event, he argued
within the boundaries of only one normative system—Islamic law—while
mobilizing both normativities against each other as incompatible. In his
second statement, addressing a secular-oriented human rights organization,
he paradoxically affirmed his commitment to the same normativity that he
had previously demonized.
Malaysia’s government supports the AHRD and UDHR on the symbolic
level of international diplomacy. Unlike Brunei, Malaysia also maintains
a Human Rights Commission, which even criticized the AHRD for ‘‘falling
short of expectation,’’ as it permits ‘‘restrictions . . . on grounds wider than what
are accepted internationally.’’66 On the level of de facto enacted domestic
policies, however, Malaysia’s human rights lobby has no impact whatsoever,
in contrast to the government’s Islamic bureaucracy. Mainstream Islamist
movements, for their part, have also discovered the language of human rights
as a political resource. PAS has set up a Bureau for Law and Human Rights,
which declared in 2011 that homosexuality is a violation of Article 16 of the
UDHR, which protects the fundamental right to come into a marriage as
a man and a woman.67 In replacing rights with duties, and obscuring the fact
that the UDHR is meant to protect sexual self-determination, PAS’s approach
bears similarities to those illustrated above, namely re-signifying ‘‘human
rights’’ with paradoxical meanings to justify religio-political claims that are,
strictly speaking, incompatible with fundamental rights stated in the AHRD
and UDHR.
65. ‘‘PM Says ‘Human Rightism, Humanism, Secularism’ New Religion Threatening Islam,’’
Bernama (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysia), May 14, 2014; ‘‘Najib Now Says Committed to Human Rights,
Days after Denouncing ‘Human Rights-Ism’,’’ Malaysian Insider, May 17, 2014.
66. Asia Pacific Forum, ‘‘Malaysia: ASEAN Human Rights Declaration Falls Short of Expec-
tation,’’ November 19, 2012, <http://www.asiapacificforum.net/news/malaysia-asean-human-rights-
declaration-falls-short-of-expectation> accessed August 1, 2014.
67. ‘‘PAS Youth: LGBT Lifestyle Contravenes Human Rights,’’Malaysiakini, November 5, 2011.
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ASEAN-IZING SHARIAH LAW? CROSS-BORDER IMPACTS OF
BRUNEI’S SHARIAH REFORM
Parallel to a regional approach to the protection of human rights, transna-
tional networks for the promotion of Islamic law are being forged. On the
initiative of Brunei’s chief Islamic judge, an ASEAN network of cooperation
for Shariah courts was formed in 2013.68 It comprises representatives of
Islamic courts from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and
Thailand. While it is important to note that this particular network is not
concerned with an Islamic penal code, it is significant that Sultan Hassanal
Bolkiah and State Mufti Awang Abdul Aziz Juned have expressed their hope
that Brunei’s SPCO 2013 would become an ‘‘example for the rest of Southeast
Asia’’ to follow.69
In the preparation for SPCO 2013, Brunei authorities consulted with
Islamic institutions that have experience with Islamic criminal law, including
in Saudi Arabia, Aceh Province (Indonesia), Pakistan, and Malaysia.70 The
government of Brunei has praised Saudi Arabia as a leading role model for
a ‘‘successful’’ implementation.71 Conversely, Middle Eastern countries have
lauded Brunei’s legal reform. The Deputy Speaker of Kuwait’s National
Assembly, for example, stated that Brunei’s Islamization policies ‘‘could
potentially lead to another strengthening of the bilateral ties with Kuwait.’’72
Malaysia’s PAS published an open letter in 2013, in which its president, Abdul
Hadi Awang, expressed his support for Brunei’s implementation of an
Islamic penal code.
A number of Malaysian politicians and ulama have since described Brunei
as a role model, and discussed how a similar reform could be realized in
68. ‘‘Asean Network of Cooperation for Syariah Courts Takes Shape,’’ Borneo Bulletin, Sep-
tember 14, 2013.
69. ‘‘Syariah Law Critics Do Not Understand Islam: Mufti,’’ Brunei Times, January 4, 2014.
70. ‘‘Enforcement of Islamic Law in Stages,’’ Brunei Times, March 13, 2013. In one of his tele-
vision sermons in 2014, Brunei’s state mufti stated that implementing Islamic law would not only
bring ‘‘blessings’’ (keberkatan), including material wealth, security, and the absence of natural dis-
asters, but also make Muslims abroad consider Brunei the ‘‘star of the East’’ (bintang timur)—Kuliah
Bersama Mufti Kerajaan [Lecture with the State Mufti], RTB1, September 2014.
71. For example, a delegation of 18 members from Brunei’s Ministry of Religious Affairs visited
Saudi Arabia to ‘‘learn’’ from its Islamic criminal law implementation and to strengthen bilateral
cooperation, ‘‘especially on the Syariah Penal Code’’—‘‘Brunei Delegation Discusses Syariah Im-
plementation with Saudi Officials,’’ Brunei Times, February 11, 2014. See also ‘‘Saudi Arabia May
Help Brunei Train Syariah Judges, Other Judicial Officials,’’ Brunei Times, May 3, 2014.
72. ‘‘Kuwait Supports Brunei’s Syariah Law Implementation,’’ Brunei Times, June 7, 2014.
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Malaysia. In December 2013 the sultan of the PAS-controlled Malaysian state
of Kelantan made an official visit to Brunei, followed soon after by Kelantan’s
chief minister and a state government delegation. Kelantan’s sultan, chief
minister and state mufti unanimously emphasized their admiration of Bru-
nei’s ‘‘courage’’ and declared their intention to ‘‘learn’’ from its Shariah
legislation.73 Shortly afterward, a delegation from the Malaysian state of
Selangor’s Fatwa Committee visited Brunei. Its head declared that ‘‘every
Muslim [in Brunei] must think positively’’ about the SPCO 2013 and ‘‘help’’
implement it: ‘‘If he hears [of] any individual that does not approve . . . the
implementation of Syariah law then he should educate the individual.’’74
The delegation leader also shared his institution’s experience with fighting
apostasy, and explained to his Bruneian counterparts that Malaysia’s ‘‘Syariah
courts would not allow individuals to murtad [become apostates], therefore
they send them for counseling. There have been many successful cases . . .
when the individuals change their mind after counseling.’’
While Brunei’s legal reform has triggered heated debates about imple-
menting hudud in Malaysia, many pious Malays are now wondering why
Malaysia is still refusing to enforce ‘‘God’s law,’’ resulting in growing anxieties
among Malaysia’s non-Muslim and less Islamist-oriented Muslim popula-
tions. One of Malaysia’s most popular religious scholars, Ustaz Azhar Idrus,
has called on Malaysian politicians to follow Brunei’s model.75 Most recently,
a delegation from Malaysia’s Ministry of Religious Affairs, headed by the
minister himself, visited Brunei in September 2014 to learn about ‘‘the
implementation of various Islamic initiatives, which include the Syariah
Penal Code Order 2013.’’76
73. ‘‘Kelantan to Learn from Bruneian Syariah Penal Code,’’ Brunei Times, December 26, 2013;
‘‘Abdul Hadi Awang Tahniah dan Syabas kepada Negara Brunei Darussalam’’ [Abdul Hadi Awang
Congratulates and Lauds Brunei Darussalam],Harakah Daily (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia), November
21, 2013; ‘‘Umno MP Says Party Will Support PAS’s Hudud Plan in Kelantan,’’ Malaysian Insider,
November 16, 2013; ‘‘Masa Sesuai Laksana Hudud’’ [The Time is Right to Implement Hudud], Sinar
Harian (Shah Alam, Malaysia), January 12, 2014; ‘‘Hudud: Veteran UMNO, KMPP Sokong Pas’’
[Hudud: UMNO, KMPP Veterans Support PAS], Utusan Online (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia), April
13, 2014; ‘‘Hudud: Bersediakah Kita?’’ [Hudud: Are We Ready?] Sinar Harian (Shah Alam, Ma-
laysia), May 4, 2014.
74. ‘‘Call for All Muslims to Help Educate Others on Syariah law,’’ Brunei Times, May 23, 2014.
75. ‘‘Komen Ustaz Azhar Idrus Sultan Brunei Jalankan Hudud’’ [Ustaz Azhar Idrus’s Comment
on Brunei’s Sultan Implementing Hudud], YouTube, January 15, 2014, <http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v¼_pKNy39EeB8> accessed August 1, 2014.
76. ‘‘Regional Efforts Needed to Promote Islamic Causes,’’ Brunei Times, September 9, 2014.
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Encouraged by the Brunei-inspired wave of intensified pro-hudud senti-
ment, the Kelantan legislative assembly passed its own hudud act in March
2015, notably also operating with a model of implementation in ‘‘stages.’’ The
Shariah Criminal Code II 1993 (Amendment 2015) follows up on attempts to
implement hudud in Kelantan in the 1990s, which were stopped by the
central government’s intervention. However, parts of the UMNO-led gov-
ernment have signaled that they might now accept the law, or parts of it,
although this might also have been a temporal party-political maneuver. In
the Kelantan State Assembly, all 12UMNO delegates voted for the new code.
Brunei’s decision to forge ahead with its legal Islamization policies may
therefore raise the stakes in the region, particularly vis-a`-vis the dynamics of
‘‘piety-trumping’’ between competing Muslim political groups in Malaysia.77
In Indonesia, unlike Malaysia, calls for implementing hudud laws do not play
a central role in mainstream political discourse, and they have not become
identity markers for large Muslim organizations in any comparable manner.
However, some Indonesian voices, particularly from the more radical spec-
trum, have enthusiastically lauded Brunei’s legal reform.78
CONCLUSION
This article is not intended to question the theoretical possibility of multiple
justificatory grounds for human rights. Certainly, adherents of differing nor-
mative traditions may endorse the same conception of universally acceptable
human rights and justify it in their own terms. In the case of (re)interpreting
Islamic law, this can be observed in the courageous writings of several liberal
Muslim thinkers across the globe, including Southeast Asia (but excluding
Brunei). However, when it comes to the realities of contemporary Islamic
governance and public religious discourse in Brunei and Malaysia, the idea of
plural justifications of human rights faces serious obstacles. In both countries,
hardline Islamist ideals of antipluralistic state organization have moved from
77. Liow, Piety and Politics, p. 13; cf. Human Rights Resource Centre, Keeping the Faith, pp. 53 ff.
78. See for example a ‘‘news’’ report on the Indonesian website Arrahmah.com, which is locally
infamous for its sympathies for and personal proximity with jihadi terrorist organizations, and
managed by Muhammad Jibril Abdul Rahman, the son of a former Jema’ah Islamiyah member:
‘‘Jawapan Sultan Brunei atas Kecaman Barat terhadap Penerapan Syari’ah Islam’’ [Response of the
Sultan of Brunei to Western Criticism over the Application of Islamic Law], Arrahmah, May 11, 2014,
<http://www.arrahmah.id/news/2014/05/11/jawaban-sultan-brunei-atas-kecaman-barat-terhadap-
penerapan-syariah-islam.html> accessed April 20, 2016.
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the margins to the mainstream. This has developed to the point where no
Muslim political leader or governmental Islamic scholar openly defends
a brand of Islam that acknowledges the right to freedom of thought, con-
science, or religion—or accepts an equal legal and social status without
distinction of gender or religion. Most obviously, this tendency is manifested
in numerous ways: the increasing enforcement of Islamic criminal law, intro-
duction of corporal punishment for religious offenses, systematic discrimi-
nation against followers of alternative interpretations of Islam, imprisonment
of ‘‘heretics,’’ forced ‘‘religious counseling,’’ moral policing, and the empow-
erment of religious bureaucracies and enforcement agencies. All of these
phenomena and their underlying discursive trends can, to varying degrees,
be observed in both countries, where an antipluralistic brand of Shariah law
presently characterizes the implementation of Islamic policies.
Although Islamic policymakers in Brunei andMalaysia are in some instances
referring to Islamic law and human rights simultaneously, which may be read
as an attempt at bridging the two, the paradoxical ways this is done impede the
project of a transdoctrinal, plural justification of human rights and subsequent
universal acceptance of human rights. To be sure, the statements of the sultan
of Brunei and his state mufti do indicate that from their perspective, universal
human rights are supported by their own, Shariah-based doctrines. However,
some of the specific meanings they ascribe to ‘‘human rights’’ are transforming
the signifier’s contents to an extent that makes a substantially ‘‘unifying con-
clusion’’ practically impossible. That does not mean that Shariah law and the
UDHR- or AHRD-based conceptions of human rights are incompatible per
se, or that there would be nothing in human rights treaties on which there
would be consensus. But the mainstream discursive construction of Shariah
law, as it is now hegemonic in Brunei and Malaysia, and its power-political
embeddedness and institutionalization, give very little reason to believe that
a unifying conclusion on matters pertaining to religious freedom might be
supported by Islamic policymakers in the foreseeable future—even less so as
they at least occasionally denounce ‘‘human rights’’ in populist discourses of
proclaimed cultural identity difference vis-a`-vis ‘‘the West.’’ As the realities of
Shariah politics in both countries illustrate, there is consensus neither on the
philosophical foundations of human rights nor on the unconditional validity of
human rights declarations and treaties.
The simultaneous upholding of international human rights declarations
that protect religious freedom on the one hand, and of a normatively
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incompatible interpretation of Shariah law on the other—and the diverse
modes of navigating between the two in political rhetoric—illustrate the
flexible ways in which social actors generally position themselves in between
multiple normativities. However, in the context of Islamic governance in
Brunei and Malaysia, this flexibility has clear-cut boundaries, insofar as an
uncompromising insistence on the normative superiority of Islamic law effec-
tively defines the contents and real-life consequences of domestic policies,
whereas the proclaimed commitment to human rights declarations remains
largely limited to a symbolic level of international diplomacy.
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